Anomalous visual experience is linked to perceptual uncertainty and visual imagery vividness by Salge, Johannes H et al.
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Psychological Research 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-020-01364-7
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Anomalous visual experience is linked to perceptual uncertainty 
and visual imagery vividness
Johannes H. Salge1 · Stefan Pollmann1,2,3 · Reshanne R. Reeder1,2 
Received: 14 November 2019 / Accepted: 20 May 2020 
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
An imbalance between top-down and bottom-up processing on perception (specifically, over-reliance on top-down process-
ing) can lead to anomalous perception, such as illusions. One factor that may be involved in anomalous perception is visual 
mental imagery, which is the experience of “seeing” with the mind’s eye. There are vast individual differences in self-reported 
imagery vividness, and more vivid imagery is linked to a more sensory-like experience. We, therefore, hypothesized that 
susceptibility to anomalous perception is linked to individual imagery vividness. To investigate this, we adopted a paradigm 
that is known to elicit the perception of faces in pure visual noise (pareidolia). In four experiments, we explored how imagery 
vividness contributes to this experience under different response instructions and environments. We found strong evidence 
that people with more vivid imagery were more likely to see faces in the noise, although removing suggestive instructions 
weakened this relationship. Analyses from the first two experiments led us to explore confidence as another factor in parei-
dolia proneness. We, therefore, modulated environment noise and added a confidence rating in a novel design. We found 
strong evidence that pareidolia proneness is correlated with uncertainty about real percepts. Decreasing perceptual ambiguity 
abolished the relationship between pareidolia proneness and both imagery vividness and confidence. The results cannot be 
explained by incidental face-like patterns in the noise, individual variations in response bias, perceptual sensitivity, subjec-
tive perceptual thresholds, viewing distance, testing environments, motivation, gender, or prosopagnosia. This indicates a 
critical role of mental imagery vividness and perceptual uncertainty in anomalous perceptual experience.
Introduction
Perception is the mental interpretation of external sensory 
stimuli—an individualized experience that requires a deli-
cate balance between top-down (cognitive) and bottom-up 
(environmental) sources of information. A tip in that balance 
toward internal sources can result in differences in percep-
tual biases and even errors. One internal source of sensory 
information is visual mental imagery, which is the ability 
to “see” with the mind’s eye. There is wide individual vari-
ability in visual imagery vividness (Kosslyn, Brunn, Cave, 
& Wallach, 1984). Several studies have shown that if an 
individual’s imagery is strong (i.e., more sensory-like), it 
will activate sensory brain regions to a larger extent than if 
an individual’s imagery is weak (Bergmann, Genç, Kohler, 
Singer, & Pearson, 2016; Cui, Jeter, Yang, Montague, & 
Eagleman, 2007; Dijkstra, Bosch, & Gerven, 2017; Lee, 
Kravitz, & Baker, 2012; Olivetti Belardinelli et al., 2009). 
A higher reliance on sensory brain regions for imagery 
means a higher neural overlap for imagery and perception. 
An over-reliance on imagery for perception may contribute 
to anomalous perceptual experience, such as hallucinations 
in pathological conditions (Shine et al., 2015).
Hallucinations are proposed to occur when people fail 
to distinguish between mental imagery and sensory input 
(also referred to as “reality monitoring” errors: Aleman 
et al., 2003; Bentall, 1990; Smailes et al., 2020). In line with 
this, previous studies have found evidence for a link between 
mental imagery vividness and hallucination proneness in 
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this 
article (https ://doi.org/10.1007/s0042 6-020-01364 -7) contains 
supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
 * Reshanne R. Reeder 
 reshanne.reeder@gmail.com
1 Department of Experimental Psychology, Institute 
of Psychology, Otto-Von-Guericke University, Magdeburg, 
Germany
2 Center for Behavioral Brain Sciences, Magdeburg, Germany
3 Beijing Key Laboratory of Learning and Cognition 
and School of Psychology, Capital Normal University, 
Beijing, China
 Psychological Research
1 3
various disorders (Aleman et al., 2000; Aynsworth et al., 
2017; Shine et al., 2015). Because most studies of anoma-
lous perception rely on clinical samples, it is impossible 
to disentangle whether these experiences emerge from a 
predisposition (i.e., more vivid imagery prior to disorder), 
or develop comorbidly with pathology (i.e., more vivid 
imagery following the onset of a disorder). In the current 
study, we, therefore, addressed this problem by investigat-
ing the link between imagery vividness and anomalous per-
ception in a normative sample, prior to (or in the absence 
of) pathology. We hypothesized that the extent to which an 
individual relies on mental imagery to inform perceptual 
decisions (and the likelihood to commit a reality monitoring 
error) may be linked to individual imagery vividness. To test 
this hypothesis, we turned to pareidolia.
Pareidolia—the misinterpretation of veridical sensory 
information—is a type of reality monitoring error that is 
commonly experienced in the normative population (Smailes 
et al., 2020; Uchiyama et al., 2012). Pareidolia proneness is 
also linked to hallucination proneness in pathology (Mamiya 
et al., 2016; Uchiyama et al., 2012; Yokoi et al., 2014). Vis-
ual pareidolia experience is thought to reflect a strong reli-
ance on internally generated visual information for visual 
processing (Smailes et al., 2020), and can be induced reli-
ably with perceptually ambiguous visual stimulation, such 
as briefly presented patches of Gaussian noise. In an often-
used paradigm by Zhang et al. (2008), subjects are required 
to detect faces in this noise. Over training trials, real faces 
become more difficult to detect, until the final training trials 
contain no faces. In the main experiment, only pure noise 
images are presented, but subjects reliably report the pres-
ence of faces throughout.
Because pareidolia is a subjective experience influenced 
by top-down factors, we hypothesized that there should be 
individual variability in the frequency of these percepts. 
In line with this, we found that pareidolia experiences are 
reported with varying prevalence across studies that have 
used the same or similar experimental design (Liu et al., 
2014; Rieth, Lee, Lui, Tian, & Huber, 2011; Zhang et al., 
2008; Zimmermann, Stratil, Thome, Sommer, & Jansen, 
2019). In Zhang et al. (2008), the percentage of face-present 
responses in 16 subjects ranged from nearly 8% to more 
than 50% (standard deviation (SD) = 14%). Liu et al. (2014) 
reported the percentage of face-present responses at over 
34%, with a SD of over 15% for 20 subjects. Rieth et al. 
(2011) reported 39% face-present responses, after excluded 
nearly 25% of their 229 subjects who reported to see fewer 
than 5 faces in the whole experiment. At the cortical level, 
one recent study found that face-selective cortical areas were 
only activated in 4/9 subjects in this design (Zimmermann 
et al., 2019). These results clearly show a range of indi-
vidual differences in pareidolia proneness that has not yet 
been explained. In the current study, we investigated whether 
individual imagery vividness (that is, the strength of top-
down sensory representations) contributes to this variability.
One problem is that the variability in subject responses 
reported in previous studies could be attributed to confound-
ing factors in the experimental design. It is possible that 
some subjects report to see faces in noise simply because 
they feel pressured to respond positively (e.g. on about 50% 
of trials), and so lower their response criterion; furthermore, 
responses may be influenced by bottom-up patterns con-
tained in the noise that happen to appear face-like (Gosselin 
& Schyns, 2003; Rieth et al., 2011), and some subjects may 
have a lower “signal detection” criterion than others (Dolgov 
& McBeath, 2005). Therefore, the aim of the current study 
was to investigate the role of imagery vividness in pareidolia 
proneness when controlling for these factors.
We conducted a behavioral replication of Zhang et al. 
(2008; Exp. 1a), a follow-up to minimize acquiescence 
response bias (Exp. 1b), and interim analyses to rule out 
additional response biases and specific bottom-up influences 
on responses. Following those analyses, we suspected that 
perceptual uncertainty may also contribute to pareidolia 
experiences, so we conducted two further experiments to 
increase (Exp. 2a) and decrease (Exp. 2b) the noisiness of 
the environment and explore the effects of both imagery 
vividness and perceptual confidence on pareidolia prone-
ness. Our results support the hypothesis that both vivid 
imagery and a decrease in perceptual confidence contribute 
to pareidolia proneness. Importantly, we discuss how these 
factors contribute to anomalous perceptual experience in 
the healthy population, and how we might be able to better 
understand pathological hallucinatory experience from these 
experiments.1
Experiment 1a: replication
Experiment 1a was a direct replication of Zhang et  al. 
(2008). Here, we were interested to investigate the role of 
imagery vividness in pareidolia proneness using the same 
paradigm that has been used in previous studies.
1 Our experiments and references all focused on the visual domain, 
so we can only make conclusions based on visual imagery and visual 
pareidolia. We are aware that imagery, hallucinations, and pareidolia 
also occur in the auditory domain (e.g., Moseley et  al., 2018; Nees 
& Phillips, 2015), so it is likely that our results would generalize to 
other, perhaps multiple, senses. This would have to be investigated in 
future studies.
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Methods
Subjects
The experiment was performed in the Magdeburg Experi-
mental Laboratory of Economic Research (MaXLab) at 
Otto-von-Guericke University in Magdeburg, Germany. 50 
subjects were recruited via the MaXLab online recruitment 
tool. All data were collected over 3 testing days, and were 
analyzed following complete data collection. We obtained a 
diverse sample of bachelor’s and master’s students studying 
engineering, business/economics, social science, psychol-
ogy, mathematics, medicine, sport science, history, philoso-
phy, and computer science. All subjects provided written, 
informed consent to take part in the experiment. Subjects 
were reimbursed for 10 euros for the 1-h experiment, as per 
laboratory guidelines. The experiment was approved by the 
Otto-von-Guericke University ethics committee and adhered 
to the tenets of the Declaration of Helsinki.
8 subjects were excluded due to incomplete data (no 
responses on a questionnaire and/or the main experiment) 
or failing to pass the attention check. We had a final group 
size of 42. Our sample included 20 women, 4 left handed, 5 
English speakers, and 37 German speakers, with a mean age 
of 24.21 years (range 20–35).
Apparatus
The experiments were performed on 19-inch Belinea 
10 19 20 and Hanns-G HA191 computer monitors with 
1280 × 1024 pixel resolution and 60 Hz refresh frequency. 
There were 46 cm between the monitor and the table edge. 
Subjects performed the experiment from a free-viewing 
distance with no chin/head stabilization. Natural variations 
between testing environments and testing day/time of day 
did not affect subject performance (see Supplementary 
Material: 1. Environment and testing time analysis).
Stimuli
Gaussian noise stimuli were generated using MATLAB 
(MATLAB R2013a, Version 8.1.0.604) following the proce-
dure described in Zhang et al. (2008). We filled a 480 × 480-
pixel matrix with multiple Gaussian blobs of different sizes 
and contrasts. The positions of the blobs were chosen from 
a uniform distribution over the image. Three possible blob 
sizes (standard deviations) were chosen from a bivariate nor-
mal distribution. To keep the appearance of the stimuli bal-
anced, the number of blobs were kept inversely proportional 
to their size (fewer large blobs, more small blobs). Each 
blob appeared with an intensity (luminance) amplitude cho-
sen randomly from a list of six possible values between − 1 
(black) and 1 (white), with mean gray set at 0. These values, 
in terms of deviation from mean gray, were − 0.3 (− 15%), 
− 0.25 (− 12.5%), − 0.2 (− 10%), 0.2 (10%), 0.25 (12.5%), 
and 0.3 (15%). Table S1 (Supplementary Material: 2. Noise 
parameters) gives an overview of the size and frequency 
distribution of blobs within each noise image. An example 
noise image and its resulting spatial frequency spectrum are 
shown in Fig. S1a.
Face stimuli (only presented during training) were gener-
ated for a different study (Towler, Parketny, & Eimer, 2016) 
and obtained from the corresponding author. These were 
ten male faces created with computerized facial compos-
ite software (FACES 4.0; IQ Biometrix; https ://www.iqbio 
metri x.com/produ cts_faces _40.html). All features (e.g., 
eyes, nose, mouth) were unique to each face. For the current 
study, we additionally removed the hair and facial outline, 
and blurred the edges of the faces using Photoshop. Images 
were then scaled to 398 × 398 pixels (~ 11.15° visual angle; 
see Fig. 1a). From here, we applied an elliptical transpar-
ency gradient with a 20-pixel radius around the center of 
the images to shrink visibility of non-central facial features 
(Face Set 1; see Fig. 1b). We then performed the same 
transformation with a 40-pixel radius around central pixels 
to shrink the faces further (Face Set 2; see Fig. 1c). We 
presented both transformations of images embedded in the 
Gaussian noise during the training, so that faces were gradu-
ally more difficult to detect, and to remain consistent with 
Zhang et al. (2008).
Procedure
All experimental materials (demographics information, 
training, main experiment, questionnaires) were pro-
grammed in python with the Psychopy psychophysics tool-
box (Peirce, 2007) and were completed on the computer. 
After a demographics form, an instruction screen for the 
training appeared (full instructions can be found in the Sup-
plementary Material: 3. Experiment instructions). Subjects 
were told that faces would appear in the center of a Gauss-
ian noise image about 50% of the time. They were to press 
“1” if they saw a face, and “2” if they did not see a face, as 
soon as the image disappeared. Once subjects pressed any 
key, the training began (6 blocks of 20 trials). All stimuli 
appeared against a gray background in the center of the 
screen. The trial structure was as follows: 200 ms fixation 
cross, 600 ms Gaussian noise image, 1200 ms fixation cross 
(response period). In the first two blocks of training, a ran-
domly chosen face from Face Set 1 appeared at 40% opacity 
in the center of the Gaussian noise on half of trials, for the 
full 600 ms. In the next two blocks of training, a randomly 
chosen face from Face Set 2 appeared at 20% opacity in 
the center of the Gaussian noise on half of trials, for the 
full 600 ms. In the final two blocks of training, no faces 
appeared, unbeknownst to the subjects.
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Following the training, subjects were reminded with 
written instructions (full instructions in the Supplemen-
tary Material: 3. Experiment instructions) that faces would 
appear about 50% of the time. Additionally, they were told 
that if they saw a checkerboard pattern on some trials, 
they should not respond to it. Subjects were not verbally 
instructed about the checkerboard images (see Fig. 1d). 
These images were included to ensure that subjects read the 
instructions, since one of our hypotheses was that responses 
were influenced by instructions. Subjects were excluded 
from analysis if they responded on more than five check-
erboard trials in the whole experiment. The main experi-
ment followed the same procedure as the training, but with 
4 blocks of 120 Gaussian noise trials (plus 10 checkerboard 
trials randomly interspersed within each block). Faces never 
appeared in the main experiment.
Following the main experiment, subjects completed two 
computerized questionnaires (written versions are presented 
in Supplementary Material: 4. Questionnaires). The first 
questionnaire, designed by the experimenters, required sub-
jects to report on various qualities of the faces that they had 
seen in the main experiment (Qualities of Faces question-
naire, or QoF). At the end, subjects had the option to write 
in any additional information about their perceptions. The 
second questionnaire was the vividness of visual imagery 
questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks, 1973). Subjects were asked to 
form visual images of four scenes and subjectively rate (on 
a 1–5 scale) the imagined vividness of visual details about 
those scenes. We flipped the scale from the original VVIQ 
so that a rating of “1” meant no visual image was formed, 
and a rating of “5” meant that the image was perfectly clear 
and as vivid as perception.
Results
Similar to previous studies, we found a high amount of indi-
vidual variability in the proportion of face-present responses 
(SD = 17.47%; all group-average results can be found in the 
Supplementary Material: 5. Group-average results). Unex-
pectedly, many subjects chose not to respond on several tri-
als. We hypothesized that this was largely due to greater 
perceptual uncertainty in subjects who were more pareidolia 
prone, because we found extremely strong evidence that the 
number of non-responses was negatively correlated with the 
number of face-absent responses (see Supplementary Mate-
rial: 6. Exploring non-responses). In other words, subjects 
who were more certain that there was no face (non-parei-
dolia prone) had fewer non-responses, suggesting increased 
confidence that no face was present.
Although an interpretation of non-responses can only 
be speculative, our measure of pareidolia proneness should 
account for the different number of responses made by sub-
jects: specifically, we wanted to determine the likelihood of 
an observed number of face-present responses, weighted by 
the total number of responses and the probability of mak-
ing a face-present response. This should help to tease apart 
low numbers of face-present responses due to indecisive-
ness (more likely if there is a relatively low number of total 
responses) versus actually not seeing faces (more likely if 
there is a relatively high number of total responses). For 
Fig. 1  a The ten faces viewed during training trials in all experi-
ments, and in the main task of Exp. 2. b An example of a face embed-
ded in noise from Face Set 1, used during training trials in Exp. 1. c 
An example of a face embedded in noise from Face Set 2, used dur-
ing training trials in Exp. 1. d The checkerboard image that was used 
on attention control trials in Exp. 1
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more details concerning the logic of using probabilities over 
proportions, see Supplementary Material: 7. Proportions vs. 
probability.
To do this, we calculated pareidolia proneness as bino-
mial probabilities using the SciPy scientific computing 
library in Python (Vertanen et  al., 2020). This analysis 
takes three inputs for each subject: the number of successes 
(face-present responses), the total number of trials (total 
responses), and the expected probability of making a face-
present response. We input 0.39 as our a priori expected 
probability, which was the group-average proportion of face-
present responses in Exp. 1 of Rieth et al. (2011; Exp. 1 was 
the same task as ours). Because we wanted to distinguish 
between individual probabilities that were above and below 
the expected probability (probabilities above 0.39 indicated 
higher pareidolia proneness, whereas probabilities lower 
than 0.39 indicated lower pareidolia proneness), our results 
are based on one-tailed tests. This resulted in probability 
values between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 reflecting 
higher probability of pareidolia proneness.
Our main analysis of interest was a ranked correlation 
between pareidolia proneness and imagery vividness (see 
Fig. 2). The imagery vividness measure was a subject’s mean 
score on the VVIQ (scores ranging between 1 and 5), with 
larger numbers corresponding to more vivid imagery. The 
analysis was one-tailed to reflect the hypothesized positive 
direction of the correlation.
We performed a Kendall’s tau-b (τb) correlation and cal-
culated the likelihood of the alternative hypothesis using 
Bayes Factor (BF) analysis in JASP (JASP Team, 2019) with 
the stretched beta prior width set to 1. This revealed very 
strong evidence for a positive correlation between parei-
dolia proneness and imagery vividness (τb = 0.321,  BF+0 
= 31.011, 95% credible intervals (CIs) [0.102, 0.497]; see 
Fig. 2a).
Experiment 1b: instruction change
Experiment 1a demonstrated a positive association between 
pareidolia proneness and imagery vividness, but there could 
be several reasons for this effect. For one, it is possible that 
subjects who were more uncertain in their percepts felt more 
encouraged to respond positively sometimes due to sugges-
tive instructions (i.e., “faces will appear about 50% of the 
time”), rather than actually being prone to see more faces. 
We were, therefore, interested to investigate the effect of 
alleviating acquiescence response bias on response profiles. 
This would allow us to examine the influence of suggest-
ibility on the relationship between imagery vividness and 
pareidolia proneness.
Experiment 1b was the same as Exp. 1a in terms of 
design, but subjects were now instructed to respond posi-
tively only if they thought they may have actually seen a 
face, and not to worry if they did not see faces over several 
trials (for the exact instructions, see Supplementary Mate-
rial: 3. Experiment Instructions).
Methods
Subjects
Fifty-one subjects were recruited via the MaXLab online 
recruitment tool. All data were collected over 3 testing days, 
and were analyzed following complete data collection. Sub-
jects were reimbursed for 10 euros for the 1-h experiment, 
Fig. 2  A trend line (gray) and linear regression model (95% CI; gray 
shading) were fitted to the data for a Exp. 1a (N = 42); and b Exp. 
1b (N = 37). Imagery vividness (mean rating on the VVIQ) is dis-
played on the x-axis and pareidolia proneness (binomial probability) 
is shown on the y-axis. Probability values were log-transformed for 
visualization purposes, so values that appear closer to 0 (log-trans-
formed) are probabilities that are closer to 1
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as per laboratory guidelines. All subjects provided written, 
informed consent to take part in the experiment. The exper-
iment was approved by the Otto-von-Guericke University 
ethics committee and adhered to the tenets of the Declara-
tion of Helsinki. We obtained a diverse sample of bachelor’s 
and master’s students studying engineering, business/eco-
nomics, social science, mathematics, medicine, sport sci-
ence, computer science, biology, environmental science, and 
journalism.
13 subjects were excluded due to failing to pass the atten-
tion check. We had a final group size of 37. Our sample 
included 12 women, 4 left-handed and 1 ambidextrous, 16 
English speakers, and 21 German speakers, with a mean age 
of 25.49 years (range 20–37).
Apparatus
Experiment 1b took place at the same times and in the same 
environments as Exp. 1a. There was no general effect of 
environment on subject performance (see Supplementary 
Material: 1. Environment analysis).
Stimuli
Stimuli were the same as those used in Exp. 1a.
Procedure
The experimental procedure was the same as in Exp. 1a, 
except instructions were changed for both training and the 
main experiment (see Supplementary Material: 3. Experi-
ment instructions). The new instructions emphasized the 
importance of responding positively only if subjects had the 
impression that faces actually appeared, rather than respond-
ing positively about 50% of the time. This was done to gauge 
the effects of acquiescence response bias on performance, 
specifically how the removal of suggestive instructions influ-
ences the relationship between pareidolia proneness and 
imagery vividness. Subjects completed digital versions of 
the QoF and VVIQ after the main experiment.
Results
A Bayesian Mann–Whitney U test conducted on the number 
of face-present responses in Exp. 1a versus those made in 
Exp. 1b revealed anecdotal evidence that changing instruc-
tions reduced acquiescence (U = 581.500,  BF10 = 1.731; full 
group-average results are reported in the Supplementary 
Material: 5. Group-average results).
As in Exp. 1a, there was a high number of non-responses. 
These again seem to reflect uncertainty, since we found 
extremely strong evidence for a negative correlation between 
the number of non-responses and face-absent responses (see 
Supplementary Material: 6. Exploring non-responses). We 
again calculated pareidolia proneness as one-tailed binomial 
probabilities, with the expected probability set to 0.39. A 
one-tailed Kendall’s τb correlation and BF analysis con-
ducted in JASP revealed anecdotal evidence for a positive 
correlation between pareidolia proneness and imagery viv-
idness (τb = 0.206,  BF+0 = 1.940, 95% CIs [0.024, 0.405]). 
This weaker evidence for a relationship compared to Exp. 
1a suggests that there is at least some influence of suggest-
ibility on responses.
Additional qualitative analyses performed on the data 
from Exp. 1a and Exp. 1b can be found in the Supplemen-
tary Material: 8. Qualitative results, Fig. S2, and Table S2.
Interim analyses
Perceptual sensitivity and response bias
The results of Exp. 1a and Exp. 1b led us to probe deeper 
into possible effects of perceptual sensitivity and response 
bias on pareidolia proneness in the main experiment. For 
this, we looked to the training data: these data contained 
actual faces in the first four blocks of trials, so d-prime (dʹ) 
and criterion (c) could be calculated and correlated with 
main-experiment responses. Specifically, we calculated 
training-phase dʹ and c for the 40% contrast face detection 
blocks and the 20% contrast face detection blocks separately. 
This resulted in four, two-tailed Bayesian τb correlations 
with main-experiment pareidolia proneness, performed 
separately for Exp. 1a and Exp. 1b.
For both Exp. 1a and Exp. 1b, we found anecdotal evi-
dence for a correlation between training-phase c for 40% 
contrast faces and main-experiment pareidolia proneness 
(Exp. 1a: τb = 0.231,  BF10 = 1.811, 95% CIs = [0.014, 0.417]; 
Exp. 1b: τb = 0.188,  BF10 = 0.785, 95% CIs = [− 0.036, 
0.387]). This suggests a slight bias for more pareidolia-prone 
subjects to report the presence of faces in these blocks. How-
ever, when faces became more difficult to see (20% contrast 
blocks), we found moderate evidence for a true null relation-
ship between c and pareidolia proneness in both Exp. 1a (τb 
= − 0.072,  BF01 = 3.986, 95% CIs = [− 0.269, 0.134]) and 
Exp. 1b (τb = − 0.005,  BF01 = 4.700, 95% CIs = [− 0.214, 
0.208]). This suggests that subjects changed their response 
strategies when faces became more difficult to detect, and 
pareidolia-prone subjects were no differently biased than 
non-pareidolia-prone subjects.
We further found moderate evidence for a true null 
relationship between dʹ for 40% contrast face detection 
and pareidolia proneness in both Exp. 1a (τb = 0.075, 
 BF01 = 3.920, 95% CIs = [− 0.132, 0.271]) and Exp. 1b (τb = 
0.087,  BF01 = 3.552, 95% CIs = [− 0.132, 0.291]). This sug-
gests that subjects generally showed similar signal-to-noise 
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discrimination ability in these training blocks. For the cor-
relation between training-phase dʹ for 20% contrast faces and 
main-experiment pareidolia proneness, we found anecdotal 
evidence for a true null relationship for Exp. 1a (τb = 0.181, 
 BF01 = 1.271, 95% CIs = [− 0.032, 0.369]) and moderate evi-
dence for a true null relationship for Exp. 1b (τb = − 0.082, 
 BF01 = 3.679, 95% CIs = [− 0.289, 0.134]). Together, the 
results suggest no relationship between perceptual sensitiv-
ity or response bias (on training trials) and pareidolia prone-
ness (in the main experiments).
Behavioral classification analyses
From the previous analyses, we can rule out perceptual sen-
sitivity and response bias as possible explanations for the 
patterns of responses seen in Exp. 1a and Exp. 1b. Next, 
we were interested to find out whether some people are 
simply more likely than others to pick up on subtle face-
like patterns that may appear randomly in the noise images. 
Specifically, it is possible that the random distribution of 
Gaussian blobs in the noise images happened to contain 
face-like patterns, which could have influenced face-pre-
sent responses in subjects with a lower “signal detection” 
decision criterion (Dolgov & McBeath, 2005). To further 
explore this, we conducted classification analyses on the cor-
relation between subject responses and low-level properties 
of the Gaussian noise images used in these experiments. 
Previous studies have used similar methods to “render” the 
shapes of expected objects in pure noise by correlating the 
observed noise patterns with subject responses (“present” vs. 
“absent”; Gosselin & Schyns, 2003). In our first experiment 
(Exp. 1a, Exp. 1b), the identity of each noise image was 
recorded whenever subjects made a response following a 
static image presentation. The correlation between responses 
on these images and low-level noise properties were then 
analyzed for Exp. 1a and Exp. 1b separately (due to face-
presence response differences).
First, we conducted within-subjects reverse correlation 
analyses as described by Rieth et al. (2011). Here we com-
puted a Classification Image (CI) for each subject. For this, 
the grayscale values of all pixels were correlated with face-
present and face-absent responses over all 480 trials. The CI 
was then divided into nine ROIs of equal size (defined by 
overlaying a 3 × 3 grid over each noise image), to determine 
if results were tied to specific locations in the image. The 
median correlation for each ROI (including the whole-image 
ROI) was computed for each participant, then analyzed using 
an ANOVA with subject as a random factor (see Supple-
mentary Material: 9. Bottom-up analyses, Fig. S3). This 
revealed no significant differences for either Exp. 1a (F(1, 
369) = 0.61, Pr(> F) = 0.77) or Exp. 1b (F(1, 288) = 0.371, 
Pr(> F) = 0.94; see Supplementary Material: 9. Bottom-up 
analyses, Table S4 for a summary of the t tests performed 
within each ROI). Rieth and colleagues concentrated their 
analyses to the center part of the images (where correla-
tions were highest), corresponding roughly to locations 
where actual faces appeared on training trials. The authors 
found differences between the median correlations of the left 
part of the center region compared to the center-right. We, 
therefore, split our central region into two halves to analyze 
this potential difference. This analysis yielded no left–right 
differences for either Exp. 1a (t(41) =  − 0.59, p = 0.55) or 
Exp. 1b (t(36) =  − 0.25, p = 0.80).
We then performed a between-subjects classification anal-
ysis, also as described by Rieth et al. (2011), to determine 
any meaningful clusters of pixel contrasts in images that 
elicited face-present responses. For this, we computed the 
proportion of face-present responses for each noise image 
(face-present responses divided by the sum of face-present 
and face-absent responses), then correlated this with the 
grayscale value of each pixel over all 480 images.
We performed 5000 Monte Carlo simulations to find the 
expected SDs and mean correlations for random responses. 
For each Monte Carlo simulation, the order of the 480 face-
present response proportions was randomly shuffled and 
correlated with the grayscale value of all pixels over all 
480 images. Means and SDs were calculated for each pixel, 
and we used these to compute z scores for each pixel of the 
experimental CI (see Supplementary Material: 9. Bottom-up 
analyses Table S5 for a summary of these results). As in the 
earlier study, we adjusted the z score threshold to correct for 
multiple comparisons using Šidák correction with α set to 
0.05. In our study, this resulted in a threshold of z =  ± 4.259, 
which revealed no significant clusters in any part of the 
image. Figure 3a, b shows the resulting CIs for Exp. 1a and 
Exp. 1b. Each CI was further divided into nine ROIs as in 
the within-subjects analysis, to determine if any (non-sig-
nificant) clusters were tied to specific locations. While Rieth 
et al. found face-like clusters in the center region (particu-
larly the left side), we did not find any meaningful clustering 
in our noise images to any comparable extent (see Fig. 3c).
We conducted two more types of analyses on the noise 
images to more comprehensively explore potential bottom-
up influences on responses. These included analyses of the 
difference in luminance and Root Mean Square Contrast 
(CRMS) between the means of images that elicited face-
present and face-absent responses in Exp. 1a and Exp. 1b. 
Furthermore, subjects were median split into a “high” or 
“low” imagery vividness group to determine if individuals 
with different imagery vividness relied on different bottom-
up strategies. In that case, we should at least find physical 
differences between images that elicited face-present and 
face-absent responses in the group with more vivid imagery. 
However, regardless of the type of analysis performed 
(luminance, CRMS), location analyzed (whole-image, 
ROI), experiment (1a, 1b), or group split (low-imagery, 
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high-imagery), we found no low-level differences between 
images that elicited face-present and face-absent responses 
(see Supplementary Material: 9. Bottom-up analyses, Fig.
S4, and Table S6). For additional analyses of the Gaussian 
noise images based on the profile of responses in Exp. 1, see 
Supplementary Material: 9. Bottom-up analyses.
Interim discussion
The relationship between pareidolia proneness and imagery 
vividness detailed in Exp. 1 cannot be explained by percep-
tual sensitivity, response bias, or face-like patterns in the 
noise images. Reducing acquiescence response bias weak-
ens this relationship, which could indicate some influence 
of suggestibility on responses. One puzzling finding that 
we could not control was that many subjects chose not to 
respond on several trials. Since it was a replication, Exp. 1 
was not programmed to ensure that subjects responded on 
each trial (there was a fixed 1200 ms response period that 
terminated whether subjects made a response or not, as in 
previous studies). An investigation of non-responses (see 
Supplementary Material: 6. Exploring non-responses) led us 
to hypothesize that these might be meaningful, and perhaps 
related to a lack of confidence in percepts. One alternative 
explanation is that non-responses reflect a lack of motivation 
due to no real faces being present during the main experi-
ment. For Exp. 2, it was, therefore, important to change the 
design to address our hypothesis directly.
To follow-up on our “uncertainty” hypothesis, we cre-
ated a new task to increase perceptual ambiguity. Previous 
studies suggest that various illusory experiences, such as 
depth and geometric patterns, can emerge in dynamic dis-
plays of random noise (Fiorentini & Mackay, 1965; Mac-
Kay, 1965). We hypothesized that if simple illusions can 
seem to appear in dynamic displays, then these displays 
might also be conducive to complex illusions, such as face 
pareidolia. We, therefore, used dynamic Gaussian noise in 
our next pareidolia experiment. An initial pilot experiment 
(see Supplementary Material: 10. Pilot experiment A: Short 
dynamic noise) revealed that 3 s of dynamic Gaussian noise 
greatly increased the proportion of face-absent responses 
across all subjects (mean = 88.52%, SD = 15.05%), to the 
extent that there was now very little variability in response 
profiles and virtually no relationship between pareidolia 
proneness and imagery vividness. We, therefore, created an 
Fig. 3  a, b Yellow-to-red colors indicate z scores denoting posi-
tive correlations between subject responses and pixel grayscale val-
ues, and light blue-to-dark blue colors indicate z scores denoting 
negative correlations for Exp. 1a (a) and Exp. 1b (b). The range of 
z scores shown in the figure was set to match that of Rieth et al. To 
compare our results to those of Rieth and colleagues, we zoomed in 
on the central grid location where the authors of the previous study 
performed their analyses, and compared the (non-significant) clus-
ters contained in our CIs to theirs (c). This panel is reproduced, on a 
Creative Commons license, from Fig. 3 in Rieth, C. A., Lee, K., Lui, 
J., Tian, J. & Huber, D. E. Faces in the Mist: Illusory Face and Letter 
Detection in i-Perception, dx.doi.org/10.1068/i0421, volume 2, pages 
458–476, 2011, SAGE Publications Inc
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entirely new design that recruited continuous dynamic noise 
for an entire run (~ 5.5 min) to boost illusory experiences. 
This also abolished any trial structure, removed a need for 
face-absent responses (which dominated responses in Exp. 
1, and even more so in Pilot Exp. A), and further reduced 
response pressure.
Next, we presented real faces at perceptual threshold 
infrequently throughout the experiment to sustain sub-
ject motivation, due to the task requiring relatively few 
responses. Importantly, we now collected confidence ratings 
after every face-present response, to increase the likelihood 
of subjects making a response even when they were unsure 
about the presence of a face. This addition allowed us to 
directly measure confidence, rather than indirectly inferring 
it from non-responses.
Our final paradigmatic change was to extend the size of 
the noise images to fill the entire display. Our qualitative 
analyses from Exp. 1 revealed that people who reported the 
most faces also saw larger faces in variable locations, and 
details that were neither related to low-level noise patterns or 
the faces presented on training trials (e.g., “Einstein’s face” 
or “ape faces”, see Supplementary Material: 8. Qualitative 
Results). We, therefore, hypothesized that increasing the size 
of the noise would also enhance this variability in pareido-
lia experiences. Importantly, this change helps to address a 
potential confound: in the previous experiment, noise image 
size was based on pixel values and we did not stabilize sub-
jects’ heads. Because illusory experience is different across 
the visual field (see Eagleman, 2001 for a review), it could 
be argued that subjects who saw more faces happened to 
be at a critical viewing distance for pareidolia experiences. 
Extending the noise to the majority of the visual field, there-
fore, controls for this. In addition to extending the noise, we 
stabilized subjects’ viewing distance for the next experiment.
In addition to the questionnaires from Exp. 1 (VVIQ, 
QoF), we included the 20-Item Prosopagnosia Index (PI20; 
Shah et al., 2015) for this experiment. Prosopagnosia is the 
selective impairment of face recognition, and it is highly 
related to low-imagery vividness (Grüter et al., 2009). It is 
possible that the relationship between pareidolia proneness 
and imagery vividness is driven by individual differences in 
prosopagnosia. We, therefore, also conducted correlations 
between imagery vividness, pareidolia proneness, and scores 
on the PI20.
Experiment 2a: continuous dynamic 
Gaussian noise
Methods
Our goal with this experiment was to better understand 
the relationship between pareidolia proneness and imagery 
vividness by boosting perceptual ambiguity; eliminating 
response pressure; and controlling for visual field con-
founds, motivation, and the possibility that prosopagnosia 
may drive the effects. We also directly measured subjective 
confidence in percepts to explore the role of confidence in 
pareidolia proneness.
Subjects
The experiment was conducted at the Institute of Psy-
chology at Otto-von-Guericke University in Magdeburg, 
Germany. 30 students and faculty were recruited and 
performed the experiment for course credit (students), 
or purely in the interest of science (faculty). All subjects 
provided written, informed consent to take part in the 
experiment. The experiment was approved by the Otto-
von-Guericke University ethics committee and adhered 
to the tenets of the Declaration of Helsinki. Our sample 
included 23 women, with a mean age of 23.53 years (range 
19–34). Although our sample was dominantly composed 
of women, a gender-split analysis of the results of Exp. 1a 
and Exp. 1b suggest no gender differences in pareidolia 
proneness or imagery vividness for either experiment (see 
Supplementary Material: 11. Gender analyses).
Apparatus
The computer monitor was a 24-inch Samsung with 
1920 × 1080 screen resolution and 60  Hz refresh fre-
quency. There were 65 cm between the monitor and the 
table edge. Subjects’ heads were stabilized with a com-
bined head and chin rest mounted to the table. Subjects 
performed the experiment within a soundproof booth and 
in complete darkness.
Stimuli
A new set of 480 Gaussian noise stimuli were generated to 
fit the dimensions of the entire screen (1920 × 1080 pixels). 
Aside from the different size dimensions, stimuli were cre-
ated in the same way as in the previous experiments. Face 
stimuli (presented during training and the main experiment) 
were the full-face versions (see Fig. 1a) of the same ten 
images used in the previous experiments. Faces were always 
presented at 19% of full contrast. Faces were initially pre-
sented at 25% opacity during training trials, but this value 
changed according to individual perceptual threshold and 
was updated after every experimental block (see Supple-
mentary Material: 12. Perceptual threshold calculation for 
details).
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Procedure
Subjects first filled out a consent form and a paper version 
of the VVIQ. They then entered the soundproof booth and 
both chair and chin rest were adjusted so that they were posi-
tioned with their gaze centered on the screen. Subjects were 
first shown an example of the dynamic noise presented in 
the experiment. They were told that the experiment would 
involve looking at this noise continuously for about five and 
a half minutes. After each block, they were allowed to take 
a break if needed. The experimenter provided verbal instruc-
tions about the task (see Supplementary Material: 3. Experi-
ment instructions). Subjects were told that faces would be 
difficult to see. They were encouraged to keep their minds 
open for various locations, sizes, frequencies, and contrasts 
of the faces, and to respond even if they were not confident 
in their perception, because they would be able to make a 
confidence rating (on a 1–4 scale) about what they saw. A 
confidence rating of “1” meant the subject pressed the key 
by accident, whereas a confidence rating of “4” meant they 
distinctly saw a face. They were then allowed to ask ques-
tions, but the experimenter was explicitly told not to provide 
any hints about what to expect about the faces. Subjects were 
simply told to keep their minds open for anything.
Following the instructions, subjects completed four train-
ing blocks. Each block contained 20 “trials” of 4 s, with 
each trial composed of 60 randomly selected Gaussian noise 
images presented sequentially for ~ 67 ms each (15 Hz; Hz). 
Because each trial was a continuous presentation of noise 
images, subjects were unaware of any trial structure. During 
each block of the training, faces appeared on 15 randomly 
selected trials for a duration of 500 ms. They could appear at 
a distance of either 5 or 7° of visual angle from fixation, in 
any quadrant of the screen. Faces could appear at 6, 7, 8, or 
9° of visual angle in size. One face appeared on a single trial, 
and its identity was chosen randomly from the ten images. 
Subjects had 2 s to respond to the presence of a face, or else 
the response was counted as a miss for perceptual threshold 
calculation.
After the training, if subjects had no further questions, 
they began the main experiment. The main experiment was 
composed of 7 blocks of 80 “trials” of 4 s, following the 
same noise specifications as in the training. During each 
block of the main experiment, faces appeared on 20 pseudo-
randomly selected trials for a duration of 500 ms: faces could 
not appear in two sequential trials, and they could not be 
absent for more than 7 sequential trials. Within these param-
eters, the 20 face-present trials were chosen randomly. This 
ensured variability in the time between face presentations. 
Whenever subjects responded with the “1” key (which meas-
ured face-present responses), a confidence screen appeared 
for 2 s. Subjects were required to indicate their confidence 
in their response on a 1–4 scale. The confidence screen 
remained on-screen for 2 s regardless of response speed, 
after which the trials continued. The confidence screen did 
not cut into trial time, so more responses corresponded to a 
longer experiment time. The experiment took no longer than 
50 min. Following the main experiment, subjects completed 
paper versions of the QoF and the PI20.
Analyses
A detection response was coded if the “1” key was pressed 
within 2 s of the onset of a face. If subjects made a detection 
response more than 2 s after face onset, the response was 
not recorded for that trial. A misperception response was 
coded if the “1” key was pressed at any time during a face-
absent trial. Any response with a confidence rating of “1” 
(mistaken key press) was not coded as either a detection or 
a misperception, but was nevertheless recorded to determine 
the number of impulsive responses. We determined that if 
subjects made a response but did not provide a confidence 
rating within the 2-s time window, the trial would be dis-
carded—however, all subjects in the experiment were able 
to provide confidence ratings for every response.
We could not compare face-present and face-absent 
responses in this experiment, and we could no longer quan-
tify non-responses. We, therefore, performed analyses on 
the total number of detection and misperception responses, 
as well as subjects’ average confidence ratings for each 
response condition, separately. As before, our main analy-
sis of interest was a correlation analysis between pareidolia 
proneness (here measured as the total number of mispercep-
tions) and imagery vividness (mean VVIQ-score).
Results
There was quite some individual variability in the total num-
ber of misperceptions (SD = 28.37; also see Supplementary 
Material: 5. Group-average results). Because confidence rat-
ings were dependent on subjects making responses, subjects 
who made 0 misperception responses (and therefore, gave 
no misperception confidence ratings) were excluded from 
correlation analyses (N = 5). We had a final sample size of 
25 for correlations.
A one-tailed, Bayesian Kendall’s τb correlation analysis, 
conducted on the relationship between pareidolia prone-
ness and imagery vividness, revealed moderate evidence 
for a positive correlation (τb  = 0.333,  BF+0 = 6.793, 95% 
CIs [0.062, 0.549]; see Fig. 4a). Comparatively, we found 
no evidence for a correlation between real face detections 
and imagery vividness in a two-tailed test (τb  = − 0.183, 
 BF10 = 0.564, 95% CIs [− 0.419, 0.090]).
Next, we conducted correlation analyses between parei-
dolia proneness and confidence ratings for both detections 
and misperceptions. We hypothesized that the relationship 
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would be negative (less confidence in perception is asso-
ciated with higher pareidolia proneness). A one-tailed, 
Bayesian Kendall’s τb correlation analysis, conducted on 
the relationship between pareidolia proneness and detection 
confidence, revealed very strong evidence for a negative cor-
relation (τb  = − 0.426,  BF−0 = 35.553, 95% CIs [− 0.629, 
− 0.128]; see Fig. 4b). There was no evidence for a cor-
relation between pareidolia proneness and misperception 
confidence (τb  = − 0.037,  BF−0 = 0.319, 95% CIs [− 0.006, 
0.317]; see Fig. 4b). We instead found moderate evidence 
for a true null relationship  (BF0− = 3.137). This suggests 
that pareidolia proneness in our experiment was related to 
a lack of confidence in real, rather than illusory, percepts. It 
is possible that the observed relationship between pareido-
lia proneness and confidence was simply a consequence of 
perceptual thresholding: subjects who had a relatively lower 
face detection threshold may have been more confident in 
their responses because the faces were easier to see for these 
subjects. To rule this out, we conducted a two-tailed cor-
relation analysis to determine the relationship between the 
final opacity value of real faces for each subject and their 
face detection confidence. This revealed no evidence for a 
correlation (τb  = 0.035,  BF10 = 0.264, 95% CIs [− 0.226, 
0.285]), rather showing moderate evidence for a true null 
relationship  (BF01 = 3.786).
For completeness, we also explored correlations between 
imagery vividness and perceptual confidence in two-tailed 
tests. We found anecdotal evidence for a negative correla-
tion with detection confidence (τb  = − 0.261,  BF10 = 1.262, 
95% CIs [− 0.487, 0.022]). We found no evidence for a 
correlation with misperception confidence (τb  = − 0.031, 
 BF10 = 0.262, 95% CIs [− 0.228, 0.283]), and instead found 
moderate evidence for a true null relationship  (BF01 = 3.810).
We then wanted to measure whether motivation differ-
ences contributed to pareidolia proneness. Our idea was that 
subjects who saw more real faces in the noise may have been 
more motivated to respond that they saw faces when faces 
were not actually present. We performed a two-tailed Bayes-
ian correlation between the number of real detections and 
misperceptions, and found no evidence for a relationship (τb 
= − 0.227,  BF10 = 0.857, 95% CIs [− 0.457, 0.052]).
Finally, we performed two-tailed Bayesian correlations on 
the relationship between prosopagnosia, pareidolia prone-
ness, and imagery vividness. This revealed no evidence of a 
relationship with prosopagnosia (pareidolia proneness: τb = 
− 0.110,  BF10 = 0.340, 95% CIs [− 0.355, 0.0156]; imagery 
vividness: τb = − 0.192,  BF10 = 0.610, 95% CIs [− 0.427, 
0.082]).
Experiment 2b: continuous dynamic white 
noise
Experiment 2a demonstrated that continuous dynamic 
Gaussian noise can elicit the experience of face pareido-
lia in subjects with vivid imagery. Importantly, our design 
changes from the previous experiment demonstrated that 
the relationship between pareidolia proneness and imagery 
vividness is not dependent on a static presentation of noise, 
response pressure, or changes in viewing distance or noise 
size. Because of the high number of non-responses in Exp. 
1, we also directly explored confidence in percepts in Exp. 
Fig. 4  a A trend line (gray) and linear regression model (95% CI; 
gray shading) were fitted to the data of Exp. 2a (N = 25). The scat-
terplot shows the correlation between pareidolia proneness (number 
of misperceptions; y-axis) and imagery vividness (mean rating on 
the VVIQ; x-axis). b Two trend lines and linear regression models 
(95% CIs) were fitted to the data of Exp. 2a (N = 25) for correlations 
between pareidolia proneness (y-axis) and confidence (4 = high cer-
tainty; x-axis). The correlation with detection confidence is shown 
in grayscale, and the correlation with misperception confidence is 
shown in shades of red
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2a. These results revealed a strong negative relationship 
between pareidolia proneness and confidence in real per-
cepts that cannot be explained by motivation differences. We 
hypothesized that pareidolia-prone subjects show lower con-
fidence in percepts due to a weaker ability to tell the differ-
ence between imagined and real percepts when looking for 
stimuli in perceptually ambiguous environments. We were, 
therefore, interested to find out how changing the ambigu-
ity of the environment (by decreasing the amount of noise) 
affects pareidolia proneness and confidence in responses. 
Exp. 2b used the same flexible design as Exp. 2a with one 
important change: Gaussian noise images were replaced 
with white noise images, which created an objectively more 
uniform sensory environment (see Supplementary Material: 
2. Noise parameters).
Methods
Subjects
The experiment was conducted at the Institute of Psychol-
ogy at Otto-von-Guericke University in Magdeburg, Ger-
many. 28 students and faculty were recruited and performed 
the experiment for course credit (students) or purely in the 
interest of science (faculty). All subjects provided written, 
informed consent to take part in the experiment. The exper-
iment was approved by the Otto-von-Guericke University 
ethics committee and adhered to the tenets of the Declara-
tion of Helsinki. Our sample included 16 women, with a 
mean age of 27.43 years (range 19–39).
Apparatus
The experiment environment was the same as in Exp. 2a.
Stimuli
White noise stimuli were 100 screen shots from free stock 
video footage of TV static white noise found online. An 
example noise image and its resulting spatial frequency 
spectrum are shown in the Supplementary Material: 2. Noise 
parameters, Fig. S1b. These were the same size dimensions 
as the Gaussian noise in Exp. 2a so that they filled the entire 
display. Face stimuli were the same as in Exp. 2a. In this 
experiment, faces were always presented at 19% of full con-
trast and 25% opacity. During piloting, subjects recruited 
a strategy in which any small change in the contrast of the 
white noise was reported as a face (presumably due to the 
uniformity of the environment), resulting in a lower face 
detection threshold that was not based on having seen any 
face-like features. We, therefore, did not tie real stimulus 
opacity values to subjective thresholds in this experiment, 
instead preferring to use the starting opacity values from 
Exp. 2a.
Procedure
Subjects first filled out a paper consent form and the VVIQ, 
and were given the same task instructions as in Exp. 2a. 
They completed 4 blocks of training trials like in Exp. 2a, 
except perceptual threshold was not calculated. Following 
the training, subjects were asked if they had any questions 
before beginning the main experiment. The main experi-
ment procedure was the same as in Exp. 2a. At the end of 
the experiment, subjects filled out the QoF.
Results
As in Exp. 2a, we found a high amount of individual 
variability in the number of misperceptions reported 
(SD = 23.04). The design changes further did not affect the 
mean number of misperception responses compared to Exp. 
2a (U = 409.000,  BF10 = 0.285; see Supplementary Material: 
5. Group-average results for the full analyses). Subjects with 
0 misperception responses were removed from analysis in 
the same manner as in Exp. 2a, which gave us a final sample 
size of 23 for Bayesian Kendall’s τb correlation analyses. 
Because we could not predict how changing the ambiguity 
of the environment would change responses and confidence, 
all tests were two tailed.
First, we found no evidence for a relationship between 
pareidolia proneness (total number of misperceptions) 
and imagery vividness (τb = − 0.081,  BF10 = 0.307, 95% 
CIs = [− 0.339, 0.194]), rather finding moderate evidence for 
a true null relationship  (BF01 = 3.259). We now found mod-
erate evidence for a positive correlation between detection 
responses and imagery vividness (τb = 0.380,  BF10 = 5.707, 
95% CIs = [0.068, 0.595]) (Fig. 5).
Next, we found no evidence for a correlation between 
detection confidence and pareidolia proneness (τb = 
− 0.208,  BF+0 = 0.667, 95% CIs = [− 0.449, 0.082]), rather 
finding anecdotal evidence for a true null relationship 
 (BF01 = 1.498). We furthermore found no evidence for a rela-
tionship between misperception confidence and pareidolia 
proneness (τb = − 0.032,  BF10 = 0.273, 95% CIs = [− 0.295, 
0.236]), rather finding moderate evidence for a true null rela-
tionship  (BF01 = 3.661).
For completeness, we then performed correlations 
between imagery vividness and confidence responses. 
Now, we found strong evidence for a positive correlation 
with detection confidence (τb = 0.415,  BF10 = 10.305, 95% 
CIs = [0.100, 0.625]), and moderate evidence for a posi-
tive correlation with misperception confidence (τb = 0.402, 
 BF10 = 8.265, 95% CIs = [0.088, 0.613]). These results sug-
gest a much stronger relationship between imagery vividness 
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and confidence in Exp. 2b than in Exp. 2a, both of which 
seem to have a negligent association with pareidolia prone-
ness in Exp. 2b.
We then wanted to measure whether motivation differ-
ences contributed to pareidolia proneness. We performed a 
two-tailed Bayesian correlation between the number of real 
detections and misperceptions, and found no evidence for a 
relationship (τb = − 0.036,  BF10 = 0.275, 95% CIs [− 0.299, 
0.232]), rather finding moderate evidence for a true null rela-
tionship  (BF01 = 3.641).
General discussion
In this study, we demonstrated that imagery vividness con-
tributes to pareidolia proneness in perceptually ambigu-
ous environments. This relationship may be influenced by 
suggestive instructions (Exp. 1b), but cannot be explained 
by response bias, perceptual sensitivity, or bottom-up pat-
terns in noise (Interim analyses). It furthermore cannot be 
explained by response pressure, viewing distance, noise size, 
motivation, prosopagnosia, or gender differences (Exp. 2a). 
The relationship persists when viewing both static (Exp. 1a) 
and continuous dynamic Gaussian noise (Exp. 2a). The rela-
tionship is abolished when looking for faces in a relatively 
uniform sensory environment (Exp. 2b). Previous studies 
of face pareidolia in noise have focused on the paradigm of 
Exp. 1a (Li et al., 2009, 2010; Liu et al., 2014; Rieth et al., 
2011; Zhang et al., 2008; Zimmermann et al., 2019), but 
our additional experiments demonstrate that this paradigm 
can be adapted to reveal the various factors that contribute 
to pareidolia proneness.
We additionally explored the relationship between parei-
dolia proneness and confidence in percepts, following an 
unexpected finding in Exp. 1. Our investigation revealed that 
a lack of confidence in real percepts is associated with parei-
dolia experiences in relatively noisy (Exp. 2a) but not rela-
tively uniform (Exp. 2b) sensory environments. Altogether, 
our results suggest that pareidolia experiences are linked to 
both perceptual uncertainty and visual imagery vividness.
Pareidolia proneness and imagery vividness
Our main hypothesis for this study was that more vivid 
imagery contributes to stronger sensory simulations and a 
greater reliance on imagery for perception. If the bound-
ary between imagination and reality is narrower in people 
with more vivid imagery, then they should be more prone 
to anomalous perceptual experiences in a perceptually 
ambiguous environment. We demonstrated evidence for this 
hypothesis with Exp. 2; the relationship between imagery 
vividness and pareidolia proneness persisted in the continu-
ous dynamic Gaussian noise condition (Exp. 2a), but was 
abolished in the continuous white noise condition (Exp. 2b), 
in which the main design difference from Exp. 2a was the 
presentation of more visually uniform sensory input. Com-
bined with the result that the number of misperceptions was 
statistically similar across Exp. 2a and Exp. 2b (see Supple-
mentary Material, Group-average results), we have inter-
preted the pattern of results as a difference in misperception 
decision strategy. In the low-contrast environment (Exp. 
Fig. 5  a A trend line (gray) and linear regression model (95% CI; 
gray shading) were fitted to the data of Exp. 2b (N = 23). The scat-
terplot shows the correlation between pareidolia proneness (number 
of misperceptions; y-axis) and imagery vividness (mean rating on 
the VVIQ; x-axis). b Two trend lines and linear regression models 
(95% CIs) were fitted to the data of Exp. 2b (N = 23) for correlations 
between pareidolia proneness (y-axis) and confidence (4 = high cer-
tainty; x-axis). The correlation with detection confidence is shown 
in grayscale, and the correlation with misperception confidence is 
shown in shades of red
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2b), people could have relied on physical clues to detect 
illusory faces in the noise (e.g., a cluster of relatively dark 
pixels may have been misinterpreted as a face), whereas in 
the high-contrast environment (Exp. 2a), people could not 
use this strategy, because there were always clusters of dark 
pixels (a constant feature of the Gaussian noise). In this lat-
ter case, people had to rely more on their imagination to 
detect illusory faces rather than physical clues. Both strate-
gies could elicit a similar number of face-present responses 
across subjects, but the strategy that relies more on imagery 
would correlate with imagery vividness.
Potential side effects of dynamic noise
Interestingly, our correlation between pareidolia proneness 
and imagery vividness holds in both static and dynamic 
noise displays. Dynamic visual noise (DVN) has been used 
in previous studies to try to disrupt imagery, with vary-
ing success (Andrade et al., 2002; Avons & Sestieri, 2005; 
Quinn & McConnell, 1996; Santana et al., 2013). The idea is 
that bombarding the visual system with irrelevant noise can 
potentially interfere with image formation and/or retention. 
One study demonstrated that interference only occurs when 
the DVN contains task-relevant features (Borst et al., 2012). 
In our study, the DVN occasionally contained task-relevant 
features (faint real faces), but this did not cause interference 
with imagery—at least, the relationship between imagery 
vividness and pareidolia proneness persisted in our design. 
This could be because our design was different from other 
DVN studies in two major ways:
First, people were not instructed to remember a specific 
image with a given identity, size, or location (as would typi-
cally be the case in a visual working memory task); they 
were rather instructed to look for any face, which could 
appear in any size or location on the screen. This would 
allow individuals to activate a flexible, personal representa-
tion of a face. If subjects are allowed to create their own 
image (rather than provided an imposed image), the sensory 
representation may be altered and optimized over time, mak-
ing it resistant to interference. Second, our DVN persisted 
for several minutes, which is much longer than the noise 
presented in previous studies (a few seconds, at most). Pre-
senting DVN at a critical time window (during image forma-
tion, for example) may enhance interference effects (Santana 
et al., 2013), but subjects in our experiment had as much 
time as they wanted to form and retain an image. Although 
we do not know exactly how long DVN must persist for 
this “resistance-to-interference” effect to occur, it would be 
interesting for future studies using DVN to investigate these 
more fine-grained temporal aspects.
Another temporal effect of the DVN is related to the 
rhythmic frequency of the stimulation. To create our 
dynamic environments (Pilot Exp.A, Exp. 2), noise images 
flipped at a frequency of 15 Hz. This frequency was chosen 
for trivial reasons (the refresh rate of the computers used 
for experimentation was 60 Hz, and 15 Hz constituted an 
easily divisible number of frames). Incidentally, several 
studies have found that visual flicker can elicit visual illu-
sions, which have been reported across nearly the entire 
range of perceivable frequencies from delta to gamma (1 
to ~ 50 Hz; Allefeld et al., 2011; Becker & Elliott, 2006). 
The strongest illusory experiences, however, are reported 
to occur in the range of 13.1–16 Hz (Sumich et al., 2018). 
These illusions occurred infrequently over continuous 
stimulation periods of at least 30 s. Another study found 
that it took, on average, over 8 s for illusory forms to 
emerge for various flicker frequencies (Becker & Elliott, 
2006). It is, therefore, possible that the 3-s intervals of 
dynamic noise in Pilot Exp. A were not sufficiently long to 
induce illusions, whereas the continuous dynamic noise of 
Exp. 2a maximally enhanced illusory experiences.
Given that dynamic noise can have these different 
effects on perception, there are two alternative explana-
tions as to why the dynamic white noise in Exp. 2b was 
not conducive to illusory experience: the first possibility is 
that the flicker effect of the white noise was not noticeable, 
and therefore, greatly reduced flicker-enhanced illusory 
experience. The second alternative is that the objectively 
lower contrast of the white noise compared to the Gaussian 
noise induced a luminance interference effect. To expand 
on this latter point, it is possible that the luminance of 
the display may have interfered with imagery, and there-
fore, the relationship between imagery and pareidolia 
was reduced. A previous study found that image genera-
tion (and to a lesser extent, retention) can be disrupted 
by a sudden change in display luminance (Sherwood & 
Pearson, 2010). However, as with the DVN, the white 
noise in our study appeared for a continuous duration of 
5.5 min, making this explanation unlikely. Although it is 
possible that a constant luminant environment generally 
reduces imagery vividness compared to a dark environ-
ment (Thaler et al., 2014), evidence for this is scarce and 
inconsistent (Narchal & Broota, 1988). Many studies of 
visual imagery have used highly luminant backgrounds, 
particularly those that relied on projectors in earlier dec-
ades. Kosslyn et al. (1984), for one, used a projector screen 
as a reference frame for various imagery tasks (e.g., sub-
jects were required to imagine a picture within the bounds 
of the screen, or to indicate the size or location of an imag-
ined picture by holding their fingers up to the screen). 
They found that performance on many of these tasks cor-
related with self-reported imagery vividness, suggesting 
intact individual variation in imagery abilities despite 
constant luminance. Therefore, visual interference is less 
likely a general effect of viewing a luminant background, 
but rather viewing a change in background luminance at a 
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critical time window. Nevertheless, effects of background 
luminance will need to be investigated more thoroughly 
in future studies.
Pareidolia proneness and perceptual uncertainty
In Exp. 2, we added confidence ratings to responses and 
analyzed the relationship between pareidolia proneness and 
perceptual uncertainty. In Exp. 2a (continuous dynamic 
Gaussian noise), more pareidolia-prone subjects were less 
confident that a real face was not simply imagined. Con-
versely, in Exp. 2b (continuous dynamic white noise), 
there was no association between pareidolia proneness and 
confidence in percepts. In other words, it seems that a rela-
tively perceptually ambiguous environment is necessary for 
uncertainty in percepts to contribute to pareidolia experi-
ences, similar to the effects found for imagery vividness. 
To speculate on the reason for this effect, we consider the 
interaction between perceptual confidence and perceptual 
ambiguity. In Exp. 2a, the high-contrast noise led to greater 
perceptual ambiguity, and increased reliance on internally 
generated images for visual guidance. For people with low 
confidence in real percepts (who relied less on real stimuli to 
make a decision), the boundary between imagery and reality 
narrowed, leading to more misperceptions. In Exp. 2b, the 
low-contrast noise led to less perceptual ambiguity, lessen-
ing the reliance on internally generated images for visual 
processing. This broadened the boundary between imagery 
and reality, and abolished the effect of perceptual confidence 
on misperception responses.
Pareidolia as prediction error
Our findings on the contribution of confidence to pareidolia 
proneness support the interpretation of pareidolia as a real-
ity discrimination issue, particularly as a form of predic-
tion error. In the predictive coding framework, perception 
is described as a constant prediction-updating process, by 
which top-down and bottom-up signals interact to reduce 
uncertainty and prediction error, and form an individual’s 
optimal version of reality (de Lange et al., 2018; Gordon 
et al., 2017; Król & El-Deredy, 2011). Increasing noise 
(uncertainty) in the environment increases prediction error, 
because the individual must rely more heavily on top-down 
processes for perception, and this can induce illusory expe-
rience (Fermüller & Malm, 2004). Based on our results on 
imagery vividness, people with more vivid imagery may 
already rely heavily on top-down processes for perception, 
which makes them naturally more prone to prediction error. 
Therefore, the combination of perceptual uncertainty and 
vivid imagery is associated with enhanced prediction error, 
which boosts anomalous perceptual experiences.
Individual differences in perceptual experience
The current study demonstrates a range of individual differ-
ences in anomalous perceptual experiences across a norma-
tive sample. It is important to investigate these differences, 
and factors that may contribute to them, for two main rea-
sons: (1) to understand the boundary between normal and 
abnormal (clinical) perceptual differences, and (2) to deter-
mine the efficacy of normative studies in predicting more 
severe symptoms of perceptual differences, in the absence 
of pathology.
On the first point, we must do away with the idea that 
“normal” perception is a consistent, reliable, homogeneous 
process, and instead move toward the concept of a “normal 
spectrum” that is differently influenced by top-down mental 
representations and bottom-up sensory input (Reeder, 2017). 
An increased awareness of perceptual differences will ulti-
mately allow people to embrace their unique sensory experi-
ences, and may even improve quality of life.
We must emphasize that individual differences in men-
tal sensory representations (imagery) and susceptibility to 
anomalous perception are neither “good” nor “bad”, and our 
work cannot predict mental illness or any other disorder. 
What is important to note, is that people on the tail ends of 
the spectrum of imagery vividness may have much differ-
ent experiences to one another, and also to people who sit 
closer to the middle of the spectrum. Vivid imagery may be 
detrimental to one’s quality of life only if there is a comor-
bid pathology: for example, it may coincide with enhanced 
intrusive imagery in post-traumatic stress disorder (Pearson 
& Westbrook, 2015) or hallucinations in schizophrenia (Ale-
man et al., 2000). On the other hand, synaesthesia (a non-
clinical condition that involves illusory sensations and is 
associated with vivid imagery) is reported to be a neutral, or 
even enjoyable, experience (Rich et al., 2005). At the other 
tail end, having weak or no imagery may contribute to fewer 
anomalous experiences, but it is also sometimes associated 
with heightened (though non-pathological) issues with: 
working and long-term memory, face recognition, naviga-
tion, and even language comprehension (Bergen et al., 2007; 
Jacobs et al., 2018; Keogh & Pearson, 2018; Watkins, 2018). 
It is as yet unknown how low (or no) imagery may affect 
anomalous perception in pathology. In the current study, we 
did not seek to recruit the “tail-ends” of imagery vividness, 
and as a result, we did not have any individuals who reported 
a lack of imagery in our sample (see Supplementary Mate-
rial: 13. VVIQ analysis). This would be important to explore 
in future studies.
On the second point: a few previous studies have found a 
link between hallucination prevalence and pareidolia. Hal-
lucinating patients with dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB) 
see significantly more faces in noise than non-hallucinating 
patients (Mamiya et al., 2016), and patients with DLB report 
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more pareidolia experiences than patients with Alzheimer’s 
Disease or healthy controls (Uchiyama et al., 2012). The 
authors hypothesized that these results may reflect a combi-
nation of attention deficits and visual dysfunctions in DLB 
that contribute to susceptibility to both hallucinations and 
pareidolia. In line with this, both pareidolia and hallucina-
tory experiences can be reduced in patients with DLB fol-
lowing cholinergic enhancement (Yokoi et al., 2014). These 
findings provide support for the Perception and Attention 
Deficit (PAD) model of hallucinations (Collerton et al., 
2005). Nevertheless, it is unclear from these studies whether 
currently hallucination-prone patients were prone to parei-
dolia already prior to their pathology, or whether pareidolia 
proneness developed along with hallucinations in these vari-
ous disorders—a critical distinction. The pharmacological 
manipulations of previous studies point toward a pathologi-
cal origin of pareidolia in hallucinating patients (Uchiyama 
et al., 2012; Yokoi et al., 2014), in favor of the PAD model. 
However, studies of normative samples (including the cur-
rent study), favor an interpretation based on prediction error 
(Smailes et al., 2020). In line with this, clinical studies have 
demonstrated that some kinds of hallucinations may be 
explained as a misattribution of imagery as reality (Aleman 
et al., 2000; Aynsworth et al., 2017; Shine et al., 2015). It 
is, therefore, important to investigate pareidolia proneness in 
the absence of (or prior to) pathology, to better understand 
the relationship between normal and abnormal anomalous 
perception.
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